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LEGISLATION
CORPORATIONS-DENIAL OF THE DEFENSE OF USURY LIMITED
Introduction
Almost every known civilization has denounced usury.' At one
time any agreement whereby a lender received anything of value in
return for a loan was condemned as usurious. 2 However, this con-
cept has been modified to the extent that usury is now considered to
be only the receipt of a sum greater than that permitted by statute.3
The purpose of usury statutes is to protect borrowers from the
greed of those who would take advantage of their need by extorting
an unconscionable rate of interest in return for a loan. Despite this
valuable social and moral purpose, 4 argument has been made in oppo-
sition to usury statutes by denying their social necessity.5 One court
has objected to the usury law on the legal ground that it is ". . . a
barbarous act, unworthy of the age and country where it is found,
for it abrogated the just and equitable maxim, that a plaintiff, to en-
title himself to equity, must do equity, and required the chancery
courts to lend their aid to enforce a penalty or forfeiture." 6 In addi-
tion, arguments concerning the economic validity of such legislation
have long been made. Those who have opposed usury statutes on
economic grounds maintain that they are the result of paternalistic
governmental action which arbitrarily restricts freedom to contract.7
Money, it is said, varies in price like other commodities; there is no
1 For an historical survey of the usury laws, see Dunham v. Gould, 16
Johns. R 367 (N.Y. 1819); Horack, A Survey Of The General Usury Laws,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1941); Santos, An Appraisal of Usury Laws,
25 PHIL. L.J. 501 (1950); Note, Unlicensed And Licensed Usury In Utah,
4 UTAH L. REv. 67, 68 (1954).
2 See Salin, Usury, in XV ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 193 (1950); Santos, supra
note 1, at 502.
3 See note 2 supra. "A bargain under which a greater profit than is per-
mitted by law is paid, or is agreed to be paid to a creditor by or on behalf
of the debtor for a loan of money, or for extending the maturity of a pecuniary
debt, is usurious and illegal." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 526 (1932).
4 See Salin, supra note 2, at 193; Santos, supra note 1, at 501.
5 See Gov. John A. Dix, Annual Message-1873, in VI MESSAGES FROM THE
GOVERNORS 522, 551-52 (Lincoln ed. 1909).
6 Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 151 (1857).
7 See BAUMGARDT, BENTHAM AND THE ETHICS OF TODAY 152-58 (1952);
Gov. William L. Marcy, Annual Message-1837, in III MESSAGES FROM THE
GOVERNORS 605, 631 (Lincoln ed. 1909) ; Salin, Usury, in XV ENcYC. Soc. Sci.
193, 196 (1950).
LEGISLATION
more reason for controlling the price of money than for regulating
the cost of other commercial products. The law of supply and de-
mand should control the rate of interest; 8 it is claimed that if it did,
the rate would diminish.9 On the other hand, proponents of usury
laws assert that the economic argument in favor of "free trade in
money" is generally put forth by lenders.' 0 A refutation of the "free
trade" argument was presented by Governor Myron H. Clark in his
Annual Message to the Legislature in 1855. He reasoned that money
would not be free even if the usury laws were repealed because gov-
ernment would still invest it with an arbitrary valuation. Before
freeing money from the restraint of usury laws, he believed that it
should be "assimilated" to the products of labor, rather than having
an arbitrary valuation placed upon it. As to the anticipated diminu-
tion in the rate of interest which is forecast, he stated:
The argument relied upon by the advocates of repeal is, that it will make
money cheaper. But wherever this experiment has been tried in our country,
the opposite effect has been produced. Even in our commercial metropolis,
where are found those who are most strenuous on this subject, that description
of paper supposed to be exempted from the taint of usury, can be negotiated
only at rates of interest varying from twelve to twenty-four per cent per annum.
Borrowing at this onerous rate, leads to almost certain ruin. It may be an-
swered that only in times of pressure are the rates of interest so high. But
what, if the power to regulate the Whole question resides with capitalists, is
to bring down the rates? What is to make money more plentiful and cheap
when those who possess it have the power to keep it scarce and dear? There
is a given amount of capital among us, seeking investment. If our laws rigidly
prohibited the taking of more than the legal rate of interest, that capital would
be available for all legitimate business purposes. If loans are made reluctantly
at legal rates, it is because usurious ones may be obtained, through the violation
or evasion of the laws.11
There is, however, injustice in forcing lenders to accept a specified
rate of interest without considering the risk involved in each transac-
tion. Despite this hardship and the recurring difficulties encountered
in enforcing usury laws,' 2 it is submitted that their socially beneficial
effects give decisive force to the reasoning which favors them.
8 See BAUMGARDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 152-58; Marcy, supra note 7,
at 605, 631.
9 See Salin, supra note 7, at 196.
10 See Gov. Myron H. Clark, Annual Message-1855, in IV MESSAGES FROM
THE GOVERNORS 780, 802-04 (Lincoln ed. 1909).
1" Id. at 804.12 See Birkhead, Collection Tactics Of Illegal Lenders, 8 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 78 (1941) ; Gov. John Jay, Annual Meysage-1798, in II MESSAGES FROM
THE GOVERNORS 397, 400 (Lincoln ed. 1909); Gov. Horatio Seymour, Annual
Message-1854, IV id. at 709, 731-32.
1955]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
New York Statutes
Recognizing this, New York has developed a statutory scheme
designed to prevent unjust exactions of interest. By statute the legal
rate of interest is six per cent; 13 no person may take any greater
sum for a loan.1 4 An agreement to pay more is, of course, void and
will not be enforced by the courts. 15 Anyone who has paid a greater
sum, or his legal representative, is given the right to recover the
excess over six per cent, if an action is brought within one year of
the payment.' 6 Moreover, if the borrower brings an action to recover
the unlawful amount which he has paid, the courts cannot require
him, as a condition precedent, to pay any part of the principal or
legal interest which may be due.' 7 The state's interests are asserted
by providing that if an action to recover the unlawful amount is not
brought by the borrower or his representative within one year from
the time of the loan, then within three years, the public welfare official
of the town or county where payment was made may bring sUit.1 8 In
addition, the usurer, in certain instances, may be criminally prose-
cuted for a misdemeanor.' 9
Borrowing, by one important institution in New York's vast
economic life, however, is not restricted by the usury laws.20  Since
1850, corporations, by statute, have not been permitted to "interpose
the defence of usury in any action." 21 Broadly included as a cor-
poration are ". . . all associations and joint stock companies having
any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by
individuals or partnerships." 22 This special consideration resulted
from the legislature's abhorrence 23 of the decision in the case of
Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co.,24 decided in 1850.
There, the plaintiff bank had found itself in financial difficulties and,
in order to stay in business, borrowed money from the defendant at
a usurious rate of interest. The plaintiff was successful in his at-
tempt to have the bills of credit and trust deed which were executed
to the defendant declared void because of the usurious loan. Com-
13 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 370.
14 Id. § 371.15 Id. § 373. There are certain exceptions to the agreement being void which
are not pertinent here. Id. §§ 372, 379.
16 Id. § 372.
17 Id. §377.
is Id. § 372.
19 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2400.
20 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 374.
21 Laws of N.Y. 1850, c. 172.
22 Ibid.
23 See Butterworth v. O'Brien, 23 N.Y. 275 (1861) Hungerford's Bank v.
Potsdam and Watertown R.R., 10 Abb. Pr. 24, 27 (N.Y. Gen. T. 6th Dist.
1859).
24 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).
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plete avoidance of liability made apparent the necessity of legislatively
preventing the recurrence of such a result.
Judicially it has been felt that the enactment was a complete re-
peal of usury statutes as they applied to corporations.25 Because of
the decision in the Dry Dock case, the language of the enactment,
proscribing a defense, has been interpreted to prevent corporations
from affirimatively acting to void usurious agreements.2 6 Since usury
was not to be used as a "shield," it could not be employed as a
"sword." 27 Similarly, although it had not been expressly provided
by the legislature, foreign corporations were denied the right to plead
usury.28 The statute has also been interpreted as denying the defense
to a receiver of a corporation because he stands in no better position
than the corporation itself.29 For much the same reason guarantors,3 0
sureties,3 ' endorsers,32 accommodation endorsers 33 and co-makers 34
of corporate paper have been restrained from pleading usury as a
defense. In an action to foreclose a corporate mortgage the defense
of usury is unavailable. 35  In one case, the defendant corporation
executed a mortgage to secure a bond issue; in the action to foreclose,
the fact that the bonds were usuriously discounted was not permitted
25 See Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 229 (1857) ; MacQuoid v. Queens Estates,
143 App. Div. 134, 127 N.Y. Supp. 867 (2d Dep't 1911). See also State Bank
v. Hoge, 35 N.Y. 65, 69 (1866) (as borrower).
26 See Isle of Wight Co. v. Smith, 51 Hun 562, 563 (N.Y. Gen. T. 2d Dep't
1889).
27 Butterworth v. O'Brien, 23 N.Y. 275, 278-79 (1861) (dictum).
28 Southern Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Packer, 17 N.Y. 51 (1858).
29 Butterworth v. O'Brien, 23 N.Y. 275 (1861).
30 See Salvin v. Myles Realty Co., 227 N.Y. 51, 124 N.E. 94 (1919); Union
Estates Co. v. Adlon Constr. Co., 221 N.Y. 183, 116 N.E. 984 (1917); Pink
v. L. Kaplan, Inc., 252 App. Div. 490, 300 N.Y. Supp. 45 (2d Dep't 1937);
Kings Mercantile Co. v. Cooper, 199 Misc. 381, 100 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
31 See General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.2d 238 (1949);
Stewart v. Bramhall, 74 N.Y. 85 (1878) ; Pink v. L. Kaplan, Inc., supra note 30.
32 Ludington v. Kirk, 17 Misc. 129, 130, 39 N.Y. Supp. 419 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1896) (dictum) ; see Stewart v. Bramhall, supra note 31; Union Nat'l
Bank v. Wheeler, 60 N.Y. 612 (1875) (memorandum opinion); Graves v.
Lovell, 38 N.Y. Super. Ct. (6 J. & S.) 154 (Gen. T. 1874); Baronberg v.
Humphreys, 166 Misc. 100, 1 N.Y.S.2d 415 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937) (semble);
Arona Holding Corp. v. West Twenty-Fifth St. Realty Corp., 198 N.Y. Supp.
660 (N.Y. City Ct. 1923).
33 See Ollendorf v. Lissberger, 176 Misc. 661, 28 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 263 App. Div. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1st Dep't 1941). But see Strong
v. New York Laundry Mfg. Co., 37 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 J. & S.) 279 (Gen. T.
1874); Hungerford's Bank v. Potsdam and Watertown R.R., 10 Abb. Pr. 24
(N.Y. Gen. T. 6th Dist. 1859).
34 See Rockmore v. Epstein, 127 Misc. 526, 217 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct.
1926). But see Astra Pictures, Inc. v. Schapiro, 182 Misc. 19, 48 N.Y.S.2d
858 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1944).
3 New York Title and Mortgage Co. v. Mapletree Estates, Inc., 139 Misc.
393, 247 N.Y. Supp. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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as a defense.36 Further, a mortgage based upon a usurious agreement
is in no way impaired when the corporate mortgagee assigns part of
it to an individual.3 7 A shareholder has been denied the right to have
a corporate bond and mortgage, executed for a usurious loan, de-
clared void.3 8 But if a corporation succeeds to the contract rights of
an individual, it may maintain conversion for property pledged with
the defendant as collateral for a usurious loan.39 More recently, the
original reason for not allowing corporations to assert the defense has
been obscured by rationalizations based upon economic factors. It
has been asserted that the function of usury laws is to protect needy
individuals. Unlike an individual, a corporation ". . . has no sensa-
tions and cannot be coerced by its necessities into any legal obliga-
tions beyond its defined and limited corporate powers. It is pri-
marily a creature of the law under which capital concentrates for
business.... An individual may borrow from a need springing from
personal necessities, but a corporation becomes a borrower volun-
tarily to enable it to carry forward some enterprise which affords a
reasonable expectation of profits sufficient both to repay the necessary
interest and to secure an ultimate emolument to those who own its
stock or form its membership." 40
Jenkins v. Moyse
Criticism of the New York statute has not been directed at its
purpose but rather at what is, in the opinion of many, its abuse.
Despite this criticism, however, similar legislation has been enacted in
seven other states.41 The leading case of Jenkins v. Moyse 42 aptly
illustrates the situation that has been condemned. 48  There, an action
3G Proudman v. Shaw Service Stations, Inc., 255 App. Div. 857, 7 N.Y.S.2d
526 (2d Dep't 1938) (memorandum opinion).
37 Stevens v. Buffalo, Coming and N.Y.R.R., 45 How. Pr. 104 (N.Y. 1865).
38 MacQuoid v. Queens Estates, 143 App. Div. 134, 127 N.Y. Supp. 867(2d Dep't 1911).
39 Merchants Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 49 N.Y. 635
(1872).
40 Coffin, Usury in California, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 290 (1928).
41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2306 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 612.62 (1944);
ILL. REV. STAT. c. 67, § 67.08 (Jones, 1934); IND. STAT. ANN. § 19-2001 (Bums,
1950) (A corporation, in writing, may agree to any rate.); MD. CODE ANN.
art. 23, § 121 (Flack, 1951); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.78 (1937); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. tit. 171 § 1701.85 (Baldwin, 1953). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 19
(1941) provides that no railroad corporation may interpose usury as a defense.
For a comprehensive collection of usury statutes in all of the states, see BARRETT,
COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS (1952).
42 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
43 Earlier cases indicated that a different result might have been reached.
See, e.g., Anam Realty Co. v. Delancey Garage, Inc., 190 App. Div. 745,
180 N.Y. Supp. 297 (1st Dep't 1920); Fort v. 415 Central Park West Corp.,
131 Misc. 774, 777, 227 N.Y. Supp. 351, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; First Nat'l Bank
v. American Near East and Black Sea Line, Inc., 119 Misc. 650, 197 N.Y. Supp.
[ VOL. 30
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in equity was brought to have a mortgage declared usurious and void.
The plaintiff had been informed that d loan would not be made to him
as an individual because of the limited rate of interest permitted to
be exacted and that, in order to obtain the needed funds, a corpora-
tion would have to be formed. Realty was to be transferred by the
plaintiff to the corporation, and mortgaged by the corporation to the
defendant in return for the usurious loan. That the defendant did not
offer to lend money to the plaintiff individually controlled the finding
that the corporation was not a mere cloak or cover for the usury.
It was recognized that the plaintiff, through stock ownership, in-
directly benefited from the loan, controlled the property and indirectly
suffered because of a foreclosure. Nevertheless, the fact that the loan
was made to, and the mortgage executed by, the corporation was
thought to be controlling. Holding that the loan was made to the
corporation and therefore that usury could not be a ground for void-
ing the mortgage, the court stated that " [t] he law has not been evaded
but has been followed meticulously in order to accomplish a result
which all parties desired and which the law does not forbid." 44 It
seems obvious that the corporate privilege was being perverted in
order to evade the usury statutes. Equally obvious is the fact that
the law of this case has been consistently followed. 45
The propriety of permitting a corporation to be formed for the
sole purpose of obtaining a loan at a usurious rate of interest is ques-
tionable. The statutory privilege of incorporation is attended by pre-
rogatives not afforded individuals or partnerships. 46 Limited liability
of shareholders, aggregation of capital, continuous succession, man-
agement by directors and transferability of stock are the more common
advantages. 47  There is no doubt that a corporation may be formed
by an individual in order to obtain one 48 or more of these benefits.
However, none of the above so blatantly violates any other statutorily
expressed public policy, as does the use of the corporate form to evade
the usury laws. The latter is inexcusably destructive of the respect
856 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Commentators have differed as to correctness of the
Jenkins case. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, COPORATIONS § 132 (rev. ed. 1946);
Note, 5 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 91 (1930); 30 CoLuTm. L. RZv. 1075 (1930);
38 CORNELL L.Q. 93 (1952) ; 16 CORNELL L.Q. 90 (1930) ; 15 MINN. L. REv.
112 (1930); 4 U. CN. L. Rv. 496 (1930).
44 Jenkins v. Moyse, supra note 42 at 324, 172 N.E. at 522.
45 See, e.g., Werger v. Haines Corp., 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951)(memorandum opinion); Bradley v. Selengut, 269 App. Div. 209, 54 N.Y.S.2d
457 (1st Dep't 1945); Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co., 237 App. Div.
535, 261 N.Y. Supp. 747 (2d Dep't 1933), reversing 145 Misc. 734, 260 N.Y.
Supp. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Kings Mercantile Co. v. Cooper, 199 Misc. 381,
100 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1950). But see 38 CORNELL L.Q. 93, 95-96 (1952).
46 See BAL.LANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 1 (rev. ed. 1946); PRASEKER, CoRPo-
RATIONS 91-95 (2d ed. 1949).
47 See PRASHKER, op. cit. supra note 46, at 91-95.
48 See, e.g.. Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103,
127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
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due the laws of the state. Moreover, it is impossible to discern any
legislative intent to establish this privilege as an inducement to form
a corporation.
Amendment of Section 374
It was the widespread use of corporations to evade the usury
laws that prompted the New York Legislature recently to amend the
statute which denies the defense of usury to corporations. 49 The
amendment provides that:
The provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation, the principal
asset of which shall be the ownership of a one or two family dwelling, where
it appears that the said corporation was organized and created within a period
of six months prior to the execution, by said corporation of a bond or note
evidencing indebtedness, and a mortgage creating a lien for said indebtedness
on the said one or two family dwelling.50
It is manifest that the amendment will not completely solve the prob-
lem because it is applicable only where the "principal asset" of the
corporation is a one or two family dwelling. For example, if the cor-
poration's sole asset is a three family dwelling, or two one family
dwellings, the amendment, prima facie, will not apply. Mortgaging
the one or two family dwelling more than six months after incorpo-
ration will also take the transaction outside the scope of the amend-
ment. Whether a dwelling is the "principal asset" of the corporation
when some other property is owned by the corporation, is a question
that has been left to judicial interpretation. Recognizing that usurers
have consistently exhibited a flexible deviousness in evading statutory
prohibitions,5' courts should be on their guard to prevent the frus-
tration of the amendment's purpose.
Conclusion
Although the amendment does not offer a completely satisfactory
remedy to the harmful device sanctioned by Jenkins v. Moyse,52 it
is directed toward that end. Perhaps a more effective amendment
would be one that denies the defense of usury only to "trading" or
"business" corporations; by such a provision individual borrowers
will be protected, while commercial transactions will be left unfettered.
For too long usurers have been permitted to oppress small borrowers
by imposing a debased corporate form upon them.
49 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 374, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1955, c. 673.50 Laws of N.Y. 1955, c. 673.
51 See Collins, Evasion And Avoidance Of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 54 (1941).52254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
[ VOL. 30
